Chapter 9: An anchor to the ground

Theme: January 1959 to September 1962. Describes the development of the worldwide network and some of the operational problems which had to be ironed out. Asks a basic question: When danger threatens, how much can you trust a man alone in space?

Throughout the flight the astronaut would be alone and on his own, but he had one link with the ground -- his radio and telemetry system. In a worldwide network of stations on the ground, several hundred engineers and physicians were to be ready to answer questions, give advice, and if need be, send the signal which would begin the automatic initiation of a reentry. Designing and constructing this network was almost as big a job as building the spacecraft itself.

A first question to be decided was how many stations were needed. Was it necessary to be able to talk to the astronaut at all times? Or could communications be intermittent? It soon became apparent that it would be too expensive and probably unnecessary to have the capability of speaking to the astronaut at all times. But even to be able to speak to him at intervals no longer than ten to fifteen minutes would require a number of stations spread around the world. Constructing this network was not an easy task. The orbits passed over neutralist countries which were not at all sure that they wanted an American tracking station on their soil. Once the number and placement of stations had been determined, it was necessary to decide how to link them with a rapid system of communications.

There were also operational problems. Should the astronaut call the stations or should they call him? Should the astronaut be required to give regular reports, or should the stations talk only to the astronaut when he requested their help? Most important of all, what information should be displayed to the ground stations and how should it be displayed?

Many debates centered around these questions, but perhaps the fundamental problem was who was to have the final word in controlling the flight. The astronauts were used to being in control of their own aircraft. While as pilots they would take instruction from tower flight controllers during landings and take offs, they were always basically in full control of the flight and the final decision was always their own. In space flight, however, there were so many complex problems that it was argued that final, authoritative flight control should be on the ground.

This made the astronauts nervous. It is the nature of the pilot to have full confidence in his own capability. If he did not, he could not continue to take the risks that he does. He has also learned to be skeptical of the ability of others who are not directly under his observation and control. The astronauts were not at all sure that they wanted someone on the ground making critical life and death decisions for them. The flight controllers were equally adamant that they were not going to put final decisions in the hands of an astronaut who might be made sick or even become unconscious due to the unusual conditions of the space environment. How could we get around this impasse? One method was to make the astronauts themselves flight controllers and to put them in charge of the voice communication with the man in space. In this way, he would hear a familiar voice at all of the major ground stations. He would know that it was someone who understood intimately his own problems; a man in whom he had confidence.

Another important method of building confidence was continuous practice. No Broadway play has ever gone through more rehearsals. No stars ever practiced their lines and actions more frequently than the astronauts and the flight controllers. In integrated mission simulations the prospective astronaut would make mock flights with the ground trainer tied in with the control center. At their positions in the control center the flight monitors would go through their activities as on the day of the flight itself. Such simulations were run literally hundreds of times until every problem had been worked out. Nevertheless, some unforeseen difficulties remained, as the actual flights would show. But from each flight something new was learned. By the third orbital flight a relatively efficient system in which all had confidence had been developed.